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INTRODUCTION
In May 1998, Guatemala initiated a lawsuit against Philip Morris
and several of the world's leading tobacco manufacturers in United
States District Court, seeking compensatory and punitive damages
for the cost of treating its citizens' tobacco-related illnesses.' In par-
ticular, Guatemala alleged that the U.S. tobacco industry had will-
fully misrepresented the health risks associated with smoking, and
had manipulated the level of nicotine in cigarettes so that the Guate-
malan people would remain addicted. Shortly after Guatemala initi-
ated its suit, Ukraine, Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and the Bra-
zilian state of Goias brought their own actions, using similar
arguments as those set forth by Guatemala.'
1. See Ann Davis, Guatemala Sues Tobacco Firms to Recover Health-Care
Costs, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1998, at B13 (explaining that affiliates of many
American tobacco companies are involved in the suit because they control a sub-
stantial part of the Guatemalan cigarette market); see also Ron Nissimov. Guate-
mala Sues U.S. Tobacco, NEWS & OBSERVER (RALEIGH, N.C.), May 15, 1998, at
A20 (stating that Guatemala sought $800 million in compensatory damages and
$2.4 billion in punitive damages); Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at Paras 5-
15, In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp. 2d 125
(D.D.C. 1999) (No. 98-CV-0 1185) (listing and describing the following defen-
dants: the Tobacco Institute Inc.; the Council for Tobacco Research- U.S.A.;
B.A.T. Industries, PLC; the British American Tobacco Co.. Ltd.; BATUS Hold-
ings, Inc.; Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation; Philip Morris Companies,
Inc.; Philip Morris Incorporated; Philip Morris International, Inc.; Liggett Group,
Inc.; Brooke Group Ltd.).
2. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d 125, 127 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing the basis of Guatemala's complaint).
3. See Bill Miller, U.S. Rejects Guatemala Suit; Judge Says It Cannot Prove
'Direct Injury' by Cigarette Makers, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1999, at A20 (stating
that the foreign governments' lawsuits are likely to be decided in the same manner
as Guatemala's since they are all being heard by the same judge in the U.S. District
Court of the District of Columbia). While transferring Bolivia's lawsuit to the Dis-
trict Court of the District of Columbia, a federal judge in Texas used disparaging
and sarcastic language in describing the suit's merits. See Republic of Bolivia v.
Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("Why none
of these countries seems to have a court system their own governments have confi-
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The U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia dismissed
Guatemala's lawsuit, stating that the government's injury was too
attenuated and completely contingent upon the harm incurred by the
Guatemalan people.4 The remoteness doctrine, which provided the
basis of Judge Paul Friedman's decision, prevents a plaintiff from
claiming injuries that stem from some type of direct harm exacted on
a third party, such as an individual Guatemalan smoker.! Thus, the
court held that the defendants' actions were not the proximate cause
of the government's alleged injuries.' Because the Guatemalan gov-
ernment's injuries were so remote, the court concluded that the
amount of money spent on treating its citizens was too speculative to
calculate.7 The court ultimately suggested that the Guatemalan peo-
ple could seek redress for this problem in their own court system.
This Comment argues that the remoteness doctrine should not
automatically bar claims by developing nations against the tobacco
industry. This Comment further asserts that the doctrine of parens
patriae 9 should enable a developing nation to bring suit against the
dence in is a mystery to this Court... This Court seriously doubts whether Bra-
zoria county has ever seen a live Bolivian ... even on the Discovery Channel.").
4. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 126 (dismissing Guatemala's claims).
5. See id. at 128 (quoting Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503
U.S. 258, 268-69 (1992)) ("Under the doctrine of remoteness, a plaintiff who com-
plains of harm 'flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by
the defendant's acts [is] generally said to stand at too remote a distance to re-
cover."'). See generally Victor E. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine: A Rational
Limit on Tort Law, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 423 (1999)(stating that the
remoteness doctrine is an important limit on liability especially when a plaintiff
asserts a derivative injury).
6. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 129-30 (asserting that the actions of the individual Guatemalan smoker
served as an intervening link betveen the defendants and the Guatemalan govern-
ment).
7. See id. at 130 (arguing that it would have been too difficult to predict the
success of any smoking cessation efforts the Guatemalan government would have
taken had it not been misled by the tobacco industry).
8. See id. at 134 (discussing why the Guatemalan government cannot obtain
standing in the United States under the doctrine of parens patnae.
9. Parens patriae allows a state to bring a claim on behalf of its citizens. For a
complete discussion of the parens patriae doctrine and recommendations as to how
it can be applied to a Third World nation's suit against the tobacco industry, see
2001]
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tobacco industry in the United States.
Part I discusses In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs
Litigation' ("the Guatemala decision" or "the Guatemala court"),
and explores how the court may have misapplied the remoteness
doctrine. Part II examines how the Guatemala decision and other re-
cent developments may affect the ability of foreign governments and
international entities to initiate future suits against the tobacco in-
dustry." Part III argues that claims brought by developing nations are
readily distinguishable from suits filed by domestic entities in the
United States. The absence of warning labels,'2 the ability of tobacco
manufacturers to manipulate an unsuspecting populace," and the lack
of individual resources14 present unique circumstances for a devel-
oping nation to file a lawsuit. Finally, this Comment recommends
how a developing nation may use these unique factual circumstances
infra Part III.
10. 83 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 1999).
11. See Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Lawsuit Filed By Guatemala Dismissed by
Judge, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1999 at B7 (suggesting that the dismissal foretold "an
early end" to similar pending suits brought against the Industry by other foreign
countries, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and the Ukraine); see also
Gordon Fairclough & Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Companies Rail Against Verdict.
Plan To Appeal $144.87 Billion Award, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2000, at A3 (ana-
lyzing the largest punitive damages award ever and examining its long term effect
on the financial condition of the tobacco industry).
12. See Economics of Tobacco-Database, available at http://www.worldbank.
org/tobacco/brieflist dbprint.asp (last visited June 17, 2000) [hereinafter Eco-
nomics of Tobacco](stating that Guatemala did not require any type of health
warnings on cigarette packaging until 1990).
13. See generally Paula C. Johnson, Regulation, Remedy, and Exported To-
bacco Products: The Need for a Response from the United States Government, 25
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1, 28 (1991) (stating that the harmful effects of marketing and
promotional activities in the developing world are even greater given the lack of
education and governmental regulation); World Health Organization Information-
Fact Sheets: The Tobacco Epidemic in Latin America at http://witww.1who.int/inh-
fs/ en/factl96.html (May 1998) [hereinafter WHO Fact Sheets]("Tobacco advertis-
ing and promotions by multinational tobacco companies are prolific throughout the
region. Multinational tobacco companies are frequent sponsors of sports and cul-
tural events, many of which are popular with young people.").
14. See generally Pan American Health Organization: Guatemala, available at
http://www.paho.org/english/SHA/prflgut.htm (last visited June 17, 2000) [herein-
after Pan American Health Organization] (stating that 75.2 percent of the Guate-
malan people live in poverty).
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to obtain standing in United States federal courts against the tobacco
industry ("Industry") under the doctrine of parens patriae."
I. BACKGROUND
A. TOBACCO LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the 1950s, individual plaintiffs began suing the Industry in the
United States under various products liability theories and for the
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability." The Industry pre-
vailed in these suits because it successfully argued that the plaintiffs
had made an initial decision to smoke, thus assuming a risk that con-
tributed to their own health conditions.' Moreover, smokers' efforts
to hold the Industry liable were further frustrated by the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act,' which placed individual plaintiffs on
notice of the dangers associated with smoking." These decisions,
15. See Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explain-
ing that a state may obtain parens patriae standing when a quasi-sovereign interest
is threatened); see also infra notes 153-186 and accompanying text (arguing that
tobacco marketing and consumption in the developing world has had a catastrophic
effect on both the physical and economic well being of entire nations, making a
strong case for parens patriae standing).
16. See JOHN VARGO & J.D. LEE, CIPOLLONE V. LIGGEI-T GROUP, INC.: U.S.
SUPREME COURT OPENS THE DOOR TO TOBACCO LAWSUITS 5 (Matthew. Bender &
Co. 1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court decision, Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., will expose the tobacco industry to greater liability by allowing individual
injured smokers to bring actions against tobacco companies): see also Hanoch Da-
gan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Inhstries, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 354, 360 (2000) (providing a brief description of the tobacco litigation in
the United States).
17. See, e.g., Roysdon v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1192
(E.D. Tenn. 1985) (concluding that tobacco is not an unreasonably dangerous sub-
stance because its adverse effects are "part of the common knowledge of the com-
munity.").
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994).
19. See Stephens v. American Brands. 825 F.2d 312. 313 t Ith Cir. 1987)
(holding that the Cigarette Labeling Act enabled the defendant tobacco manufac-
turer to use a preemption defense in a wrongful death action), Palmer v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987) stating that the Cigarette Labeling
Act "impliedly preempts the [plaintiff's] suit because it disturbs the federally cali-
brated balance of national interests"): Roydson, 623 F. Supp. at 1191 (holding that
the defendant manufacturer had fulfilled its duty to warn of the dangers associated
with smoking by complying with the requirements set forth by the Cigarette La-
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which shielded the Industry from any sort of liability, soon came Lin-
der considerable scrutiny.
In 1992, the Supreme Court concluded for the first time that the
warnings required by the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did
not necessarily shield the Industry from liability.20 Additionally, new
revelations about the Industry's fraud and misrepresentations as well
as its continued assertion that smoking was not addictive, further
eroded the Industry's credibility with both the United States Con-
gress and the public at large.2
In response to this increased scrutiny, over forty state attorneys
general filed suit against the U.S. tobacco industry during the mid
1990s, seeking damages for the costs of treating individuals who had
suffered from smoking-related illnesses.2 The Industry ultimately
reached a settlement with forty-six states totaling $206 billion
through the year 2025.23 Although some of these lawsuits had already
beling and Advertising Act).
20. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1992) (holding
that the Cigarette Labeling Act only pre-empted state and local authorities from
requiring their own types of warning labels but did not prohibit individual plain-
tiffs from filing common law actions against the tobacco industry).
21. See John Schwartz, Tobacco Executives Deny Spiking Cigarettes, WAStI.
POST, Apr. 15, 1994, at Al (stating that seven of the nation's leading tobacco ex-
ecutives denied that tobacco was addictive or that they spiked cigarettes with extra
nicotine, when testifying before the House Energy and Commerce Committee's
subcommittee on health and the environment); see also Suein L. Hwang, Philip
Morris Memo Outlines Strategy To Study How Nicotine Affects the Brain, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 16, 1998 at A24 (analyzing a 1980 memorandum which discussed how
Philip Morris may be able to study the effect of nicotine on the brain without being
subject to regulatory oversight).
22. See Dagan & White, supra note 16, at 363 (asserting that most state law-
suits alleged that the tobacco companies engaged in conspiracy, fraud and antitrust
violations).
23. See Saundra Torry & John Schwartz, States Approve $206 Billion Deal
With Big Tobacco; Industry Retains Key Marketing Devices, WASH. POST, Nov.
21, 1998 at Al (explaining that the settlement does not afford the tobacco industry
complete immunity from individual and class action lawsuits). Mississippi, Flor-
ida, Minnesota, and Texas had previously settled with the tobacco industry, bring-
ing the its total liability to $240 billion through the year 2025. See Dagan & White,
supra note 16, at 370-71, 373 (discussing the history of the tobacco settlement);
see also Myron Levin & Kasper Zeuthen, Groups Urge Global Scope to Tobacco
Talks Lawsuits; Foreign Anti-smoking Leaders Say Settlement Negotiations Should
Address Industiy's Operations Abroad, L.A. TiMES, June 18, 1997, at DI (detail-
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been dismissed under the remoteness doctrine,' the tobacco manu-
facturers decided to settle the cases in order to secure indirect pro-
tection from bankruptcy. ' The settlement also protected the estab-
lished manufacturers from new entrants into the Industry, who were
not subject to the settlement's terms.2"
Following the states' lead, the United States government," several
ing the concerns of leaders in the international anti-smoking movement, who be-
lieved that settlement in the United States would force the tobacco industry to ac-
celerate its advertising and marketing campaigns abroad).
24. Compare Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris, Inc., 57 N.W.2d 401, 406-07
(Iowa 1998) (dismissing the state's law suit under the remoteness doctrine, claim-
ing that it would "open the proverbial floodgates of litigation"), with Texas v.
American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 968 (E.D. Texas 1997) (refusing to
dismiss Texas' suit against the industry in order to provide the state with an op-
portunity to quantify its damages).
25. See Dagan & White, supra note 16, at 378-79 (explaining how future state
plaintiffs could increase the likelihood of positive verdicts by observing earlier tri-
als and learning from the mistakes of previous plaintiffs).
26. See Cigarette Prices Rise Sharply in Wake of States' Tobaco Settlement,
WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1998, at A5 (detailing the cigarette price increases that re-
sulted from the tobacco settlement). Under the settlement, a state would receive
less money if a tobacco manufacturer lost a significant portion of its market share
to a new entrant into the industry. See Dagan & White, supra note 16, at 381-82
(describing the tobacco industry's rationale for settling with the attorneys general).
However, if a state adopted the settlement's model statute, which imposed a
twenty-cent per-package tax on new entrants, the state would no longer have its
settlement money reduced due to new entrants in the market, Id. Thus, the settle-
ment's tax would effectively bar new entrants from increasing their market share at
the expense of the established manufacturers. Id.
27. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-2496 GK, 2000 WL
1477152, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2000) (seeking to recover damages from the to-
bacco industry under the Medical Care Recovery Act, the Medicare Secondary
Payer provisions, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO")). During the appropriations process for fiscal year 2000, Congress ini-
tially attempted to restrict funding to the U.S. government's lawsuit against the to-
bacco industry. See H.R. 4635, 106th Cong. (2000) (prohibiting the Clinton Ad-
ministration from transferring appropriations from the Department of Veterans
Affairs to the Department of Justice to fund the tobacco litigation); Eric Pianin,
House Votes to Curb Tobacco Suit Funding, WASH. POST, June 20, 2000, at Al
(stating that the Department of Justice was utilizing funding from the Departments
of Veterans Affairs, Health and Human Services, and Defense to help fund its liti-
gation with the tobacco industry). But see Alan Fram, Clinton Urges House to
Fund Suit Against Tobacco Industry", WASH. POST, June 23, 2000, at A7 (analyzing
an amendment that restored partial funding to the Department of Justice to pursue
its litigation against the tobacco industry). The court ultimately dismissed the gov-
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municipalities, insurers, health and benefit trust funds, and foreign
governments filed suit against the Industry, hoping to recover the
costs of treating individuals who had suffered from smoking-related
illnesses.28 The majority of courts have dismissed such suits, how-
ever, holding that the remoteness doctrine barred such entities from
recovering health care costs.' 9
B. THE GUATEMALA DECISION
In May 1998, several months before the final settlement between
the attorneys general and the Industry, Guatemala became the first
foreign nation to file suit in the United States."° Guatemala claimed
that the various tobacco companies had conspired to cover up and
misrepresent the adverse consequences of smoking, while preventing
ernment's Medical Care Recovery Act and Medicare Secondary Payer Claims,
while allowing it to continue pursuing the RICO claim. See Philip Morris, Inc.,
2000 WL 1477152, at *2 (concluding that the government had sufficiently articu-
lated the elements of a RICO claim).
28. See, e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
191 F.3d 229, 232 (2d Cir. 1999) (alleging that the tobacco industry had attempted
to deceive the public and the plaintiff trust fund, which resulted in the trust fund
having to spend millions in treating its members' smoking-related illnesses). The
tobacco industry attempted to consolidate the U.S. lawsuit with the foreign gov-
ernments' claims. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (denying the tobacco indus-
try's request to consolidate both the foreign and U.S. lawsuits because trying the
cases separately would not deny the industry an equitable forum by which to adju-
dicate its claims).
29. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 133 n.5 (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
196 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 1999); Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 1999); Steamfitters
Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 933 (3d.
Cir. 1999)) (stating that the majority of state and federal courts have held that
"claims by third party payors for tobacco-related health care expenses are too re-
mote and indirect to allow recovery."). But see Service Employees Int'l Union
Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70, 85 (D.D.C.
1999)(finding the possibility of proximate cause between the defendant's action
and the plaintiff's alleged injury). But cf White v. Smith & Wesson, No. 1:99 CV
1134, 2000 WL 664176, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2000) (holding that the city of
Cleveland had standing to recover the costs of treating gun violence victims from
the defendant gun manufacturer).
30. See Davis, supra note 1, at B13 (providing background and commentary on
the merits of the lawsuit).
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the marketing and sale of less harmful cigarettes." Relying upon the
Industry's misrepresentations, Guatemala saw no reason to imple-
ment prevention and cessation programs. As a result, the nation was
forced to spend over $300 million between 1973 and 1997 to treat
smoking-related illnesses.32
The Guatemalan government also argued that its injuries were
distinct from the harm suffered by individual Guatemalan smokers."
The nation's specific claims of relief included common law fraud
and intentional misrepresentation, conspiracy to commit fraud, disre-
gard for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), negligence, gross negligence, and negligent misrepre-
sentation."
The defendants asserted that the remoteness doctrine prevented the
Guatemalan government from claiming an inijury based upon the
misfortunes of the Guatemalan smoker. " The defendants further ar-
gued that the individual choices of Guatemalan smokers broke the
causal chain of events between the Industry's conduct and the gov-
ernment's injury. 7 Since the government's alleged injury was com-
31. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 127 (summarizing Guatemala's complaint before addressing the defendants'
motion to dismiss).
32. See id. (asserting that the Guatemala's reliance on the industry's misrepre-
sentations inhibited the creation of prevention programs); see also Economics o]
Tobacco, supra note 12 (stating that there are neither advertising restrictions nor
minimum age requirements for purchasing cigarettes in Guatemala).
33. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 127 (arguing that the Guatemalan government was not seeking compensation
for its citizen's smoking related illnesses but rather for its own proprietary loss).
34. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994) (prohibiting an individual from col-
lecting income either through a conspiracy or a racketeering activity).
35. In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp. 2d
at 127. Guatemala's complaint also included allegations that the defendants vio-
lated antitrust law and accused the defendants of negligent performance of a vol-
untary undertaking. Id. These issues are not addressed in this Comment as they
were summarily dismissed by the court. Id. at 134.
36. See id. at 129 (arguing that the Guatemalan government's injury is "'so at-
tenuated from defendant's alleged wrongful conduct and so indirect as to require
dismissal").
37. See id. at 129 (explaining how the government's miluries are derivative of
the harm suffered by its citizens); see also Schwartz, supra note 5. at 435 ("Al-
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pletely contingent on the behavior of the Guatemalan smoker, the
developing nation was precluded from stating a claim.s The court
ultimately agreed with the defendants and concluded that the gov-
ernment's injury was too remote from the defendants' alleged ac-
tions.39
C. AN ANALYSIS OF THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE
The remoteness doctrine forms one aspect of proximate cause,
which generally limits how far liability may extend from a harmful
act.4 ° In examining proximate cause, a court must determine whether
a plaintiffs injury is both direct and foreseeable.4' If the plaintiffs
injury is either remote or unforeseeable, proximate cause will not
exist.
42
1. The Application of the Holmes Factors
In applying the remoteness doctrine, the Guatemala court exam-
ined three policy considerations set forth in Holmes v. Securities In-
though the smoker's intervening act itself may not result in the automatic applica-
tion of the remoteness doctrine, it is relevant to the general issue as to whether a
plaintiffs harm is too many steps removed.").
38. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 130 (re-iterating that the Guatemalan government would not have had to pay
any medical expenses if the individual citizen had decided not to smoke).
39. See id. at 129 (recognizing that the remoteness doctrine is not as "clear cut"
as the tobacco manufacturers have stipulated and asserting that courts have a cer-
tain degree of latitude in ascertaining whether an injury is too remote from a de-
fendant's harmful action).
40. See id. at 128 (stating that a judicial remedy cannot address every specific
harm that arises out of an alleged wrongful act); see also Laborers Local 17 Health
and Benefit Fund, 191 F.3d at 234 ("[B]ecause the consequences of an act go end-
lessly forward in time and its causes can stretch to the dawn of human history,
proximate cause is used essentially as a legal tool for limiting a wrongdoer's li-
ability only to those harms that have a reasonable connection to its actions.").
41. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 429 (demonstrating how proximate cause
provides a "conceptual explanation" of the remoteness doctrine). See generalli
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 42 at 279 (5th ed. 1984)) ("At bottom, the notion of
proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administra-
tively possible and convenient."').
42. See Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund, 191 F.2d at 235 (under-
scoring that a direct injury and foreseeability are separate concepts).
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vestor Protection Coip." The first Hohnes consideration asserts that
if a plaintiffs injury is not a direct consequence of the defendant's
act, it becomes more difficult to quantify the plaintiffs damages."
The second Hohnes factor addresses the difficulty courts encounter
in trying to apportion damages between numerous parties claiming
derivative injuries. 5 Finally, a court must assess the ability of indi-
vidual plaintiffs, who have suffered direct injuries, to seek relief on
their own behalf."
a. The First Hohnes Factor
In examining the three Hohnes factors, the Guatemala decision
consistently overlooked important factual circumstances that differ-
entiate a developing nation from a domestic plaintiff.'" In applying
the first Hohnes factor, the Guatemala court refused to speculate
about the effectiveness of any smoking cessation programs that
would have been established had the defendants not misrepresented
the dangers associated with tobacco .
43. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
44. See id. at 269 (underscoring the difficulty in separating an injury by a sin-
gular act from other independent factors ). See generally Recent Cases, Statittoryi
Interpretation-Second Circuit Holds that Health ('are Funds Lack Standing to
Sue Tobacco Conpanies Under RICO, 113 HARV. L. RL-v. 1063, 1065 (2000)
[hereinafter Statuto, hIterpretation] (demonstrating how the court in Laborers
Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund failed to account for the doctrine of fraud, when
analyzing the three Holmes factors).
45. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 (stating that indirectly injured parties would
force courts to create complex rules for dividing damages, thereby increasing the
chance of multiple recoveries).
46. See id. ("[T]he need to grapple with these problems is simply unjustified by
the general interest in deterring inJiurious conduct, since directly injured victims
can be generally counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general.").
47. See infra notes 48-97 and accompanying text (discussing how the district
court overlooked unique factual circumstances in applying the Holmes factors); see
also Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund, 191 F.3d at 235 (quoting W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 42 at 279
(5th ed. 1984)) ("Proximate cause is an elusive concept, one 'always to be deter-
mined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, justice, policy and precedent."').
48. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 131 (analyzing the difficulty of evaluating damages arising from the behav-
iors and tendencies of individual smokers).
2001]
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In Service Employees Int'l Union Health and Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris Inc. 49 ("SEIU"), the court discussed several weaknesses
in this argument!" The SEIU decision is particularly important be-
cause it was decided by the U.S. District Court of the District of Co-
lumbia only days before the Guatemala decision and involved a trust
fund that sought damages from the Industry.5'
In examining the first Holmes factor, the SEIU court spent consid-
erable time discussing the standards for a motion to dismiss. 2 When
considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept the plaintiffs
allegations as being true. 3 The SEIU court further held that a com-
plaint may only be dismissed when it appears that the plaintiff will
not be able to prove any of the facts in support of her claim.54 Thus,
without analyzing the structure of Guatemala's government or health
care system, the court summarily concluded that the government had
not suffered any sort of direct injury and that its damages would be
impossible to quantify.55 In SEIU, however, the court arguably had
49. 83 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 1999).
50. See id. at 87 (stating that if the plaintiff trust fund's claims are true, then the
tobacco industry created both a substantial and ascertainable harm).
51. See id. at 89 (holding that the remoteness of the plaintiff's claims and the
difficulty of ascertaining damages did not warrant dismissal).
52. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing the obstacles a
defendant encounters in seeking a motion to dismiss and applying such rules to the
Guatemala decision).
53. See Service Employees Int'l Union Health and Welfare Fund, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 74 (quoting Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 83 F. Supp 2d 1500, 1506
(D.C. Cir. 1984))("We must accept as true all of the material allegations in the
plaintiff's complaint . . . Defendant's factual allegations, if in agreement with the
plaintiff's, only reinforce plaintiffs case; if in disagreement must be ignored.
Thus, at this early stage of the proceedings, the only relevant factual allegations are
the plaintiff's.").
54. See id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)) (asserting
that a claim should not be dismissed unless a court concludes "'beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."').
55. In examining Guatemala's health care system, the court merely stated that
the nation provides a number of free health benefits to its citizens through public
clinics and hospitals. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litiga-
tion, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 127. However, the Guatemalan health care system is under-
going a number of systemic changes, which may make it more susceptible to fi-
nancial instability. See Pan American Health Organization, supra note 14
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more familiarity with the structure and inner workings of a domestic
trust fund, and withheld its judgment on the validity of the plaintiffs
allegations until discovery had occurred. " Thus, the Guatemala court
ignored binding precedent and prematurely dismissed the govern-
ment's claim, without providing it with an opportunity to explain
how its damages may be quantified."
Moreover, the enormous sum of money Guatemala spent on treat-
ing its citizens' tobacco-related illness clearly constituted both a con-
crete and legally cognizable injury.5' In White v. Smith & Wesson,5'
for example, a U.S. District Court ruled that the money the city of
Cleveland had spent on grappling with the effects of gun violence
constituted a cognizable injury that had ongoing adverse conse-60
quences. In addition to the costs of treating the victims of gun vio-
lence, the city had claimed that it lost significant tax revenue due to
lower productivity."' Even though an injury of lost tax revenue and
(describing the nation's ambitious expansion of primary health care services);
Derek Yach, Global Threats Demand Global Solutions: Tackling the Tobacco
Epidemic, available at http://www.tobacco.who.intentfti dyspechees.html (last
modified June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Yach] (arguing that the costs of treating to-
bacco related diseases in the developing world may alter spending patterns and in-
hibit the ability of a nation's health care system to grapple with more common in-
fectious diseases).
56. See Service Employees Int'l Union Health and Welfare Fund, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 87 ("It is not the Court's function to decide, in a motion to dismiss, as op-
posed to a motion for summary judgment at the close of discovery, whether the
Plaintiffs can develop the evidence to support their claims."): see also Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of New Jersey Inc. v. Philip Morris. Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560, 575
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to grant a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff insurer
could use extensive documentation and statistical analysis to demonstrate the
amount of money spent on treating smoking related illnesses).
57. See hI re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 130 (denying standing because the court would be forced to speculate on the
success of any smoking cessation efforts while having to account for the behaviors
of individual Guatemalan smokers).
58. See id. at 127 (stating that the Guatemalan government claimed to have
spent over S300 million in between 1973 and 1997 on the costs of treating its citi-
zens tobacco-related illnesses).
59. No. 1:99 CV 1134,2000 WL 664176 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2000).
60. See id. at *5 ("[P]laintiffs have alleged that they had suffered an injury in
fact' which is concrete, particularized, and imminent; indeed the harm has already
occurred in substantial part and will continue unless unabated.").
61. See id. (stating that the city had also claimed an injury based upon having
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lower productivity from gun violence appears to be both speculative
and attenuated, the court ultimately determined that such harms con-
stituted a real injury.62 Cleveland's alleged injury appears to be much
more abstract and uncertain than that of the Guatemalan government,
which had claimed damages only for the money spent on health
care.63 Indeed, the contrast between the two decisions further under-
scores the Guatemala court's error in ruling that damages would be
too speculative to calculate.6
Finally, the recent settlement in the United States provided a
model by which the Guatemala court could have quantified dam-
ages.6 Under the terms of the settlement, each state's funding was
based upon its overall population, the number of smokers, and the
amount of resources each state had previously allocated to its Medi-
caid program. 6 If the Industry was able to work with individual at-
to bear the costs of "enhanced police protection, emergency services, police pen-
sion benefits, court and jail costs, and medical care.").
62. Cf ROBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
SMOKING 68 (1992) (describing the difficulties in ascertaining the costs of lost
productivity due to smoking-related illnesses).
63. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 127 (detailing the developing nation's failure to take the necessary regulatory
actions to reduce and prevent tobacco consumption).
64. Compare Iron Workers Local Union No. Insurance Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 771, 784 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (allowing the plaintiff's union trust
fund an opportunity to demonstrate "that nearly 10 percent of the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars they have spent on health care has been caused by the [tobacco in-
dustry's] conduct"), with International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 734 Health
and Welfare Trust Fund, 34 F. Supp. 2d 656, 661 (N.D. Il1. 1998) (concluding that
the plaintiff health and welfare trust fund had failed to articulate how many of their
members were smokers, which prevented the funds from estimating the financial
impact of tobacco consumption).
65. See Milo Geyelin, Majority of States Backing Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 1998 at B9 (summarizing the provisions of the tobacco settlement, which
included a commitment by the industry to fund anti-smoking campaigns, advertis-
ing and promotional restrictions, and the establishment of a public health founda-
tion aimed at reducing the prevalence of smoking). See generally C. Everett Koop
& David Kessler, Desperate for a Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1998, at A29 (criti-
cizing the settlement for the lack of disclosure during negotiations, weak advertis-
ing restrictions, and the failure to include a provision for federal regulation of to-
bacco). C. Everett Koop served as the United States Surgeon General between
1981 and 1987. David Kessler served as Commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration from 1990 to 1997. See id.
66. See Suen L. Hwang & Milo Geyelin, Tobacco: Is Tobacco Settlement Good
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torneys general in devising a methodology for calculating damages, a
United States district court could have done the same. Instead of
summarily concluding that damages were too speculative to calcu-
late, the court should have undertaken a similar analysis set forth by
the U.S. settlementi.
b. The Second Holnes Factor
In addressing the second Hohes factor, the Guatemala court ex-
pressed concern that numerous plaintiffs may come forward, seeking
identical damages to those claimed by the Guatemalan government,
thus increasing the chance of multiple recoveries." Moreover, the
court noted the presence of multiple plaintiffs, which would force it
to make cumbersome rules for dividing any damages. This analysis,
however, has several flaws.
First, under RICO, a plaintiff may only recover for injuries to his
business or property. ° Thus, individual smokers who may have suf-
fered either a physical or emotional injury, could not bring a claim
News for the Industr,?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17. 1998, at BI (stating that the pro-
posal required "[t]he approval of enough states to cover 80'0 of the state Medicaid
population nationwide..."); see also Dagan & White. supra note 16, at 365 (as-
serting that the tobacco settlement based the proposed payments to the states upon
the economic loss to each state's Medicaid program and not based upon the indi-
vidual suffering of smokers).
67. Compare Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 575
(deciding that the plaintiff insurer could establish the amount of resources spent on
tobacco-related illnesses by utilizing experts and "scientific and statistically based
evidence."), with In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F.
Supp. 2d at 130 ("[P]laintiff s damages, if any. would be too speculative and too
difficult to ascertain.").
68. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 131 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269) ("[Tlhe court would be required to
adopt 'complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at dif-
ferent levels of injury... to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries."').
69. See id. (underscoring the dangers of multiple recoveries by discussing the
collateral source rule, which would permit individual plaintiffs to "recover their
own medical expenses irrespective of Guatemala's having already paid their medi-
cal bills or costs.").
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (C) (1994) (limiting civil remedies to individuals in-
jured in their business or property transactions and enabling plaintiffs to recover
three times the damages and the litigation costs that reflect a reasonable attorney's
fees).
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against the Industry under the statute.' Aside from individuals filing
suit, courts have expressed concern that employers who subsidize
health insurance costs may also seek damages under RICO. 2 In a
RICO type offense, however, a court must examine whether or not a
plaintiff relied on the defendant's alleged fraud and misrepresenta-
tions. 3 An employer, unlike a governmental body, cannot argue that
it relied on the Industry's misrepresentations when deciding how to
allocate health care spending and what types of programs to enact. 1
In contrast, an employer or insurer simply makes coverage decisions.
Moreover, in a developing nation like Guatemala, very few people
even receive health insurance through their employer, which further
reduces the risk of multiple recoveries." Therefore, the risk of multi-
ple recoveries is substantially diminished under RICO, particularly in
developing nations such as Guatemala.
In addition, the Guatemala decision fails to consider fully the sin-
gle satisfaction rule, which would enable the Industry to use any
damages awarded to the government as credit toward subsequent
overlapping lawsuits by individual smokers and employers.7'" Thus,
71. See Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Insurance Fund, 23 F. Supp. 2d at
785 (stating that under RICO, "medical expenses paid on behalf of an injured
smoking beneficiary could not make up a monetary loss or other injury to a
smoker's business or property.").
72. See, e.g., Laborer's Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund, 191 F.3d at 240
(holding that either employers or health insurers who contract with the plaintiff
trust funds may also file suit against the tobacco industry).
73. See Statutory Interpretation, supra note 44, at 1065-66 (arguing that when
a plaintiff makes a claim under RICO, courts should examine more closely the
doctrine of fraud rather than the more "rigid" analysis set forth by a proximate cau-
sation analysis).
74. See id. at 1067-68 (asserting that "the doctrine of fraud underlying the de-
fendants' offenses in [Laborer's Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Mor-
ris, Inc.]" would not apply to employers because they would be unable to show
that they relied upon the industry's misrepresentations in deciding how much to
contribute to the plaintiff trust funds).
75. See Pan American Health Organization, supra note 14 (stating that 25% of
the Guatemalan population receives their health insurance through the government
while 10% of the population receives insurance through private employers). Over-
all, less than 60% of Guatemalan citizens receive any sort of health coverage. 1.
76. See Service Employees Int'l Union Health and Welfare Fund, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 88 (concluding that the defendant tobacco industry's fear of multiple recov-
eries "is not an effort to protect against duplicative recoveries, but an effort to pre-
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the single satisfaction rule further reduces the possibility that the In-
dustry would have to pay multiple times for the same injury.
c. The Third Hohnes Factor
Finally, in examining the third Hohnes factor, the Guatemala court
concluded that a more directly injured plaintiff, the individual Gua-
temalan smoker, was the most appropriate party to file suit. In par-
ticular, the Holmes decision held that directly injured individuals
were best suited to deter a defendant's dangerous conduct by acting
as "private attorneys general."""
In ruling that an individual Guatemalan smoker was the most ap-
propriate party to file suit, the Guatemala decision overlooked sev-
eral liability-limiting factors, which may be unique to a developing
nation.0 For instance, seventy-five percent of Guatemala's citizens
live in poverty and fifty-eight percent of its citizens live in extreme
poverty." Moreover, thirty-seven percent of the nation is unem-
ployed.82 Even if an individual plaintiff had the resources to file a
lawsuit in the United States, she must also often overcome a judg-
vent any recovery"); Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Insurance Fund, 23 F.
Supp. 2d at 785 ("The payment by defendants of a judgment or settlement would
give the defendants a defense of satisfaction in any other suit in which an injured
smoker/trust beneficiary might be able to recover any of the suits sought here.").
77. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 131, n.3 (explaining that in the current case, there are "potentially multiple
plaintiffs seeking compensation for the same injury" rather than an individual
plaintiff seeking to recover multiple times from various defendants). In this foot-
note, the Guatemala decision took issue with the SEIU court's application of the
single satisfaction rule, asserting that the rule only forbids an individual plaintiff
from recovering numerous times for the same injury from multiple defendants. Id.
78. See id. at 132 (asserting that the Guatemalan people were capable of filing
suit to recover damages arising from smoking-related illnesses).
79. 503 U.S. at 269-70.
80. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 132 (citing a newspaper article where individual American plaintiffs won
judgements against the tobacco industry).
81. See Pan American Health Organization, supra note 14 (describing how
Guatemala's overall health population and economic status has begun to improve
since a 1996 peace accord was signed between the government and certain guerilla
forces).
82. See id. (analyzing the various demographics of Guatemala).
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ment of forum non conveniens,83 which virtually assures that the for-
eign plaintiff will not be able to recover.14 All of these practical con-
siderations would make it virtually impossible for individual Guate-
malan smokers to advocate on their own behalf as "private attorneys
general.""''
Additionally, under RICO, an individual plaintiff is not the most
appropriate party to seek recovery for the Industry's fraud and de-
ception. As previously discussed, to recover under RICO, an individ-
ual smoker would need to show an injury to either her business or
property.16 Moreover, a RICO claim arises when a plaintiff detri-
mentally relies on the misrepresentations of the defendant.7 An indi-
vidual smoker, as opposed to a governing body, would have a more
difficult time proving that she relied upon the Industry's fraudulent
claims in deciding whether or not to smoke." For example, a defen-
dant may have known the dangers associated with smoking but de-
83. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990) (defining forum non
conveniens as the inherent power within a court to refuse jurisdiction, particularly
when justice would be better served in a different forum).
84. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec.,
1984, 634 F. Supp. 842, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that the Indian court
system was best suited to handle the claims of the thousands of Indian citizens who
were either injured or killed by a gas leak at an Indian factory owned by an Ameri-
can corporation). In invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the U.S. dis-
trict court concluded that Indian courts would have greater access to information
about the accident. Id. The court also cited the enormous administrative burdens of
holding the trial in the U.S., the excessive costs of the litigation, and the public in-
terest the Indian government had in seeing the case tried in India. Id.; see also
Johnson, supra note 13, at 55 ("[I]n fact, the doctrine is favored by multinational
corporations because a forum non conveniens dismissal is often outcome determi-
native, effectively defeating the claim and denying the plaintiff recovery."). See
generally Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1984) (establishing the pro-
cess by which a court may apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens).
85. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70.
86. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Insurance Fund, 23 F. Supp. 2d
at 784 (asserting that medical expenses paid by an injured smoker would not con-
stitute a loss to either business or property).
87. See Statutory Interpretation, supra note 44, at 1066 (asserting that courts
have not "rigidly adhered" to proximate causation analysis, when discussing
claims under RICO.).
88. See id. at 1068-68 (demonstrating the difficulty an individual smoker
would have in proving that she would have quit smoking but for the industry's
fraud and misrepresentations).
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cided to do it anyway. In contrast, a governmental body is more
likely to keep detailed records of its decision-making process,
thereby making it easier to determine whether it relied on the Indus-
try's fraud."' The mere fact that Guatemala did not require warning
labels on cigarette packaging until 1990, provides some evidence that
the government relied on the Industry's misrepresentations.' Finally,
several courts, deciding similar cases, have concluded that a gov-
erning body or third party insurer were the most directly injured vic-
tims and therefore the most appropriate parties to file suit."
The Guatemala decision also expanded upon the third Holmes
factor, in stating that the claims against the Industry should be filed
in a Guatemalan court rather than in the United States.' Such a
course of action, however, may virtually eliminate any chance of re-
covery.93 For example, in many developing nations, death and injury
to innocent people tends to be much more commonplace, making re-
89. Cf Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc.. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 575
(describing how the plaintiff insurer kept substantial documentation of the medical
care it provided to its beneficiaries).
90. See Economics of Tobacco, supra note 12 (stating that there were no
warning labels on cigarettes until 1990 and currently there are no labeling or pack-
aging requirements concerning nicotine or tar levels).
91. See Service Employees Int'l Union Health and Welfare Fund, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 86 (determining that if the plaintiff trust fund's accusations are true, then it is
the most directly injured party), Texas, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (concluding that the
state is the most capable party to bring suit in protecting the health and well-being
of the populace); see also White v. Smith & Wesson. No. 1:99 CV 1134, 2000 WL
664176, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2000) (concluding that a city had suffered a
"concrete, particularized, and imminent" injury from grappling with the increased
medical costs and crime arising from the defendant gun manufacturer). But see,
e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund. 191 F.3d at 240 (claiming that
individual smokers were the most directly injured victims); International Brother-
hood of Teamsters Local 734 Health and Welfare Trust Fund, 34 F. Supp. 2d at
661 (utilizing the remoteness doctrine as a basis for denying a direct injury to a
plaintiff health and welfare trust fund).
92. See hi re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 132 (asserting that claims by either the Guatemalan government or its citi-
zens should be brought in Guatemalan courts).
93. Cf Marc Galanter, Legal Torpor: H'hy So Little Has Happened In India
After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 273, 274-76 (1985) (stating that In-
dia's legal system charged substantial court fees, lacked a codified tort system, and
lacked civil juries, thereby making it an inappropriate venue to hear the Bhopal
case).
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covery of damages less likely. 4 Many foreign court systems do not
regularly hear the types of tort claims that are commonly heard in
U.S. courts.9' Moreover, courts in developing nations are often both
extremely slow and inefficient.9 6 All of these factors combined would
make it virtually impossible for either an individual plaintiff or a de-
veloping nation to seek recovery in their own courts."
2. hItentional versus Negligent Conduct
The Guatemala decision also fails to make any substantive dis-
tinctions between intentional and negligent conduct.9 The court
summarily concluded that a direct injury requirement is the most im-
portant aspect of proximate cause analysis. Thus, without a direct
injury, a developing nation cannot recover for any damages, regard-
less of whether the Industry had acted intentionally.'"
Proximate cause analysis, however, often differentiates between
intentional and negligent acts even in cases where a third party has
94. See, e.g., Hanson Hosein, Unsettling Bhopal and the Resolution of Interna-
tional Disputes Involving an Environmental Disaster, 16 B.C. INT'L. & COMP. L.
REV. 285, 300 (1993) (explaining that what may be considered an injury to per-
sonal rights in the United States may only be seen as a "vicissitude of life" in other
cultures).
95. See id. at 301 (noting that victims of industrial disasters in the third world,
for example, are not eligible for compensation).
96. See, e.g., id. (asserting that in India, the long delays of obtaining a remedy
in a civil litigation, often make interlocutory relief the final judgment in a particu-
lar case, which diminishes the overall effectiveness of the justice system).
97. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (examining the economic
and legal limitations that a foreign plaintiff would encounter in filing suit against
the tobacco industry in courts of her home country).
98. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 580
(stating that proximate cause analysis draws "a sharp distinction between acts
which are deliberate and intentional from those which involve mere negligence.").
99. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F.
Supp.2d at 132 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537 (1983)) (stating that tinder the re-
moteness doctrine "the availability of a remedy 'is not a question of the specific
intent of the conspirators."').
100. See id. (concluding that Guatemala cannot recover any damages even if the
tobacco industry had acted intentionally).
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claimed an injury.""a When determining liability for an intentional
act, a court will often assess a defendant's culpability as well as the
consequences of her actions.'"
Indeed, the Industry's behavior was intentional and the conse-
quences of its actions were severe.'" For example, the World Health
Organization ("WHO"), which provides invaluable research and
health care services to developing nations, recently uncovered
memoranda and documents indicating that the Industry attempted to
subvert its activities."O The Industry sought to cut the WHO's
budget, undermine its credibility with other United Nations organi-
zations, and even plant employees in the organization, in order to ob-
fuscate the results of important research."" This example underscores
the Industry's intentional and deliberate efforts to conceal the effects
of tobacco consumption. Moreover, the consequences of the Indus-
try's intentional actions have been catastrophic, as deaths from
smoking-related illnesses in developing countries are expected to in-
crease dramatically., 6
101. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey. Inc.. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 580
(asserting that the law has a substantial interest in dissuading intentional acts that
harm innocent parties.)
102. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §435B (1965)1 tstating
that a court should consider whether the defendant -[h]as intentionally invaded the
legally protected interests of another, his intention to commit the invasion, the de-
gree of his moral wrong in acting, and the seriousness of the harm which he in-
tended.").
103. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text (discussing the extreme
lengths the tobacco industry has undertaken to subvert public research activities).
104. See Mark Kaufman, Tobacco Industr Scheme Alleged, WASH. POST. Aug.
2, 2000, at Al (summarizing the details of the "Boca-Raton Action Plan," which
sought to subvert the WHO's activities in the developing world, where the industry
was attempting to increase its market share).
105. See id. (describing how a secret industry ally. who wvas appointed to the
WHO, attempted to "redirect" the organization's activities away from smoking
prevention); see also Gordon Fairclough, Philip Morris and Other Cigarette Firms
Tried to Foil WHO, Agency's Staff Says, WALL ST. J.. Aug. 2, 2000, at A3 (ana-
lyzing tobacco industry documents, which sought to focus the industry's marketing
campaigns in nations where the WHO had initiated tobacco prevention campaigns,
thereby preventing the loss of any substantial market share).
106. See Tobacco Deceit (Cont 'd), WASH. PoST, Aug. 3, 2000, at A20 (arguing
that the Industry's attempts to improve its public standing have been rendered
somewhat meaningless, given its recent campaign to undermine the WHO's credi-
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When a defendant's actions are intentional and the harms that re-
sult from such actions are foreseeable, a plaintiff may be entitled to
seek damages, even for a derivative harm.' 7 For example, a parent or
spouse may file a loss of consortium claim when a child or family
member is either injured or killed. ' Similarly, a developing nation
should be able to recover damages from the Industry, due to the in-
tentional and deliberate nature of the Industry's behavior and the
foreseeable consequences of its actions.0 " Thus, by solely focusing
upon a direct injury requirement, the Guatemala decision summarily
overlooked an intentional harm with both adverse and foreseeable
consequences.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE LAWSUITS
Shortly after Guatemala initiated its suit, several other foreign na-
tions filed their own claims against the Industry, alleging similar le-
gal theories."0 Most of these suits are now pending before the Dis-
trict Court of the District of Columbia, where they will be heard by
Paul Friedman, the same judge who rendered the Guatemala deci-
sion."' Thus, these foreign governments are likely to encounter the
bility).
107. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 581
(examining certain exceptions to the general principle that a third party may not
recover for certain injuries).
108. See id. (stating that a plaintiff would be liable to a family member when the
consequences of the defendant's actions are foreseeable); cf Iron Workers Local
Union No. 17 Insurance Fund, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (stating that an employer may
seek damages for injuries against one of her employees).
109. Cf Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 581
(comparing the role of a parent with the role of a non-profit health care provider
and arguing that the same factual circumstances should enable the health care pro-
vider to recover damages from the tobacco industry).
110. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating that Ukraine, Bolivia,
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the Brazilian State of Goias filed suit against the to-
bacco industry).
111. See Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008,
1009 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (transferring Bolivia's lawsuit to the District Court for the
District of Columbia because the "[p]laintiff has an embassy in Washington, D.C.,
and thus a physical presence and governmental representatives there, whereas there
isn't even a Bolivian restaurant anywhere near [this court]!"); see also Geyelin,
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same legal obstacles as Guatemala, which may ultimately lead to the
dismissal of their claims."2
The Guatemala decision, however, has not completely dissuaded
foreign governments from initiating claims against the Industry."'
For example, in March 2000, the Canadian province of Ontario initi-
ated a claim against Canadian and American tobacco manufacturers,
seeking to recover the costs of treating its citizens' smoking-related
illnesses.1 4 In particular, the province sought damages for the Indus-
try's alleged conspiracy and fraud under RICO."' Ontario's suit,
however, has come under considerable scrutiny since most of its le-
gal arguments are identical to those already rejected by the Guate-
mala court."6
Given these substantial legal obstacles, certain governments and
international organizations began to seek alternate methods to hold
the Industry accountable."' The European Union ("EU"), for in-
supra note 11, at B7 (summarizing the Guatemala decision while analyzing its fu-
ture implications for similar lawsuits).
112. See Geyelin, supra note 11, at B7 (predicting that the Guatemala decision
will provide the basis for future dismissals).
113. See, e.g., Jeff Israely, In Ital'. Smoking Curbs Face an Uphtl Battle:
Health Minister Sets Out to Change a Culture. BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 2000, at
A2 (describing the difficulties the Italian government will face in filing suit against
the industry since the government actually produces one-third of the cigarettes
consumed there).
114. See Julian Beltrame, Ontario Files in U.S. Court a Lawsutt Against Group
of Tobacco Companies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2000, at B4 (summarizing the various
legal theories underlying Ontario's lawsuit); Caroline Mallan, Ontario Sues Global
Tobacco Firns in U.S. Over Health Care Costs, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 3, 2000, at
NE22 (explaining that the Ontario government is hoping to recover approximately
$59 billion Canadian for the costs of treating its citizens' tobacco-related illnesses).
115. See Beltrame, supra note 114, at B4 (stating that the claim also accused the
tobacco industry's lawyers of manipulating the American judicial system).
116. See Barry Brown, Doubts Voiced on Ontario 's Lawsuit, BUFF. NEtS, Mar.
5, 2000, at A2 (asserting that Ontario's lawsuit merely represents an attempt to
cover up the provincial government's lack of action in combating smoking). On-
tario's lawsuit will also be heard in the Second Judicial Circuit, which has previ-
ously embraced the remoteness doctrine when considering similar cases against the
tobacco industry. Cf Laborer's Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund, 191 F.3d at 239
(concluding that an union health and benefit fund was too remote a party to obtain
standing against the tobacco industry, since its injuries were dependent upon inju-
ries exacted on a third party - the individual smokers).
117. See infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text (examining lawsuits to
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stance, has sued the industry for its alleged involvement in cigarette
smuggling.' 8 In particular, the EU is arguing that the Industry's
smuggling activities are responsible for billions of dollars in lost tax
revenue."" Moreover, supporters of the lawsuit have claimed that
cigarette smuggling has caused escalating levels of crime and vio-
lence.'2 ° The EU suit, however, may already be in jeopardy since the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York recently
dismissed a similar claim by the Canadian government, which sought
damages associated with the costs of cigarette smuggling.'' In dis-
missing the case, the district court cited the remoteness doctrine,
ruling that the Industry's alleged violations were not the proximate
cause of the government's injury.'22 Thus, the EU suit, although
grounded in different legal theories than Guatemala's claim, may en-
counter similar obstacles.
prevent cigarette smuggling by both Canada and the EU).
118. See Suzanne Daley, Europeans Suing Big Tobacco In U.S., N.Y. TIMf-S,
Nov. 7, 2000 at Al (stating that smuggling has enabled the industry to sell ciga-
rettes at twenty to thirty percent less than the legal price in countries such as Spain
and Italy). Compare Up In Smoke, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 24, 2000, at 12 (criti-
cizing the EU's lawsuit, arguing that the industry has actually cooperated with
European governments in combating smuggling), with EU Should File Criminal
Charges, SUN SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA.), July 23, 2000, at 4G (arguing
that the EU should file criminal charges against the tobacco industry in addition to
its civil suit).
119. See Thanassis Cambanis, EU Body, Alleging Smuggling, Will Sue Cigarette
Makers in the U.S., WALL ST. J. EUR., July 21, 2000 at A9 (stating that cigarette
smuggling has caused the EU to lose 4.7 billion euros in tax revenue in 1998).
120. See, e.g., Tobacco Galore: Smuggling: Gordon Brown's Tobacco Tax
Teaser, ECONOMIST (Britain), Mar. 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8141200 (as-
serting that "tobacco smuggling is Britain's fastest growing category of crime.");
Rocky Relations (Spain and Great Britain Tangle Over Gibraltar), ECONOMIST,
June 15, 1995, at 58 (describing how the smuggling of tobacco and drugs by indi-
viduals in Gibraltar has caused an increase in crime in Spain).
121. See Attorney Gen. of Canada v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103
F. Supp. 2d 134, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing the Revenue Rule, which enables a
U.S. court to decline the enforcement of a foreign nation's tax laws, because such
cases are best handled by either the foreign government's executive and legislative
bodies); see also Canada Files Appeal of U.S. Court Ruling on Smuggling Suit,
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2000, at B2 (summarizing the Canadian government's efforts
to appeal the district court's decision).
122. See id. at 151 (concluding that lost tax revenue, increased tobacco con-
sumption, and increased expenditures on law enforcement are not a direct injury
under RICO).
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Finally, a recent class action victory by Florida smokers may fur-
ther strengthen some of the legal principles underlying the remote-
ness doctrine.'2 In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle,'12 a jury
awarded Florida smokers $145 billion in punitive damages, after
concluding that the Industry willfully concealed the health risks as-
smokng. The success of such class action suits will
likely raise concerns about the risks and inequities associated with
duplicative recoveries." Courts may now cite the Florida verdict to
underscore the risk of multiple recoveries in tobacco litigation,
thereby making it even more difficult for a foreign government to re-
cover any damages."
Given all of the legal obstacles foreign governments face in chal-
lenging the Industry, they may be forced to look for more innovative
ways to bring their claims, such as the doctrine of parens patriae.,
123. See Marc Kaufman, Tobacco Suit Award: S145 Billion; Fla. Jun, Hands
Industry Major Setback, WASH. POST, July 15, 2000, at Al (contrasting differing
legal and political opinions of the largest punitive damages award ever rendered).
But see Milo Geyelin & Gordon Fairclough, Tobacco Firms Maneuver to Move
Case, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2000, at B6 (analyzing the tobacco industry's strategy
of removing the class action suit to federal court, which is likely to be much more
critical of the jury's award).
124. The final decision was not published. See generalli R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing Florida plain-
tiffs to initiate a class action suit against the tobacco industry).
125. See Milo Geyelin & Gordon Fairclough. Taking a Hit: Yes, S145 Billion
Deals Tobacco a Huge Bloi, But Not a Killing One, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2000, at
Al (stating that the S145 billion award will likely be reduced on appeal given
many judges' growing hostilities about mass tort claims, as well as the tobacco in-
dustry's successes in affecting state laws).
126. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 (recognizing the difficulty the court system
would have in estimating the damages of indirectly injured plaintiffs); Hawaii
Health & Welfare Trust Fund For Operating Eng'rs v. Philip Morris, Inc., 52 F.
Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (D. Haw. 1999) (stating that the plaintiff trust fund is simply
copying suits brought by states' attorneys general and other class action suits).
127. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 435 (citing the dangers of allowing govern-
ments to recover from the Industry while class action suits are also being pursued
for the same injuries).
128. See infra notes 153-186 and accompanying text (analyzing the doctrine of
parens patriae as a method by which a government may obtain standing against the
industry).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S BEHAVIOR IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD
Under limited circumstances, a developing nation may success-
fully obtain standing against the Industry by emphasizing the sever-
ity of the Industry's fraud while demonstrating how tobacco con-
sumption affects the general health and economic well being of its
citizenry. 2 9 The combination of such factors may allow a developing
nation to obtain standing in the United States under the doctrine of
parens patriae, which enables a sovereign entity to bring suit on be-
half of its people.'30
Before discussing the doctrine of parens patriae, it is necessary to
examine the severity of the Industry's behavior in the developing
world and to discuss how such behavior may ultimately affect the
Industry's liability. In comparison to their American counterparts,
individuals in the developing world tend to be given substantially
less notice about the dangers associated with smoking.'' For exam-
129. See infra notes 130-184 and accompanying text (proposing an alternative
method by which a foreign government may obtain standing against the tobacco
industry).
130. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 1114 (defining parens
patriae as "a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests
such as health, comfort, and welfare of the people."). Courts have differed on
whether a foreign nation may file a suit under the doctrine of parens patriae. Com-
pare Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 891 F.
Supp. 4, 7 n. 3 (D.D.C. 1995) (stating that "[f]oreign sovereigns are equally enti-
tled to protect their citizens and may claim parens patriae standing to the same ex-
tent as a state."), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1975)
(acknowledging the possibility that foreign nations may obtain parens patriae
standing by discussing how the domestic limitations on the doctrine apply to for-
eign governments), with Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Decoster, 59 F. Supp. 2d
120, 123-124 (D. Maine 1999) (holding that a sovereign nation cannot assert a
quasi-sovereign interest in an American court and therefore cannot bring suit as
parens patriae).
131. See THE WORLD BANK: CURBING THE EPIDEMIC: GOVERNMENTS AND THE
ECONOMIC OF TOBACCO CONTROL 30 (1999) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK]
("People's knowledge of the health risks of smoking appears to be partial at best,
especially in low and middle income countries where information about these haz-
ards is limited."). According to the World Bank's report, sixty-one percent of Chi-
nese adult smokers "believed that cigarettes did them little or no harm." Id.
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pie, many developing nations do not require any type of warning la-
bels on cigarettes, like those required in the United States.": Thus, it
becomes more difficult for the Industry to claim that individual
smokers have knowingly engaged in an unreasonably dangerous be-
havior.'33 Since individual smokers in the developing world are less
likely to be placed on notice of the dangers associated with smoking,
tobacco manufacturers cannot use an assumption of risk defensej"
which generally shields the Industry from liability in the United
States.3 5
Tobacco prevention and education programs in the developing
world also tend to be somewhat disjointed and less effective."' Thus,
citizens in the developing world tend to receive little if any construc-
tive notice from their governments.'3" In Honduras, only fifty percent
of individuals aged fifteen through thirty knew that smoking caused
lung cancer and other types of diseases." In many areas of Latin
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331(b) (1994) (requiring a conspicuous warning label on
both cigarette packaging sold in the United States and on any cigarette adv ertise-
ments); see also Economics of Tobacco, supra note 12 (stating that Guatemala did
not require any type of health warnings on cigarette packaging until 1990); THE
WORLD BANK, supra note 131, at 47 (asserting that in 1991, only 77 countries re-
quired warning labels on cigarette packaging, and by American standards, many of
these labels would be considered to be extremely weak).
133. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 6-7 (stating that a foreign plaintiff would not
be pre-empted by the Cigarette Labeling Act, which creates "an assumption of risk
defense that is virtually insurmountable").
134. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 123 (stating that an as-
sumption of risk may serve as a defense to a negligence claim if a defendant can
successfully prove that the plaintiff knew about the risks and dangers associated
with a particular activity).
135. See generally Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1192 (stating that the harmful ef-
fects of tobacco are generally known to the community, and thus cannot be de-
clared an unreasonably dangerous substance); see also Johnson, supra note 13, at
6-7 (stating that cigarette warning labels are not required on cigarettes exported
from the United States).
136. See WHO Fact Sheets, supra note 13 (stating that "[a]lthough many coun-
tries in Latin America have passed tobacco control legislation, the legislation tends
to be weak and contain loopholes which serve to the advantage of the tobacco
companies.").
137. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 29 (stating that individuals in the developing
world are generally less aware of the health effects of smoking).
138. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SMOKI\G AND
HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS: A 1992 REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, IN
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America, even medical professionals are unaware of the risks associ-
ated with tobacco.'3 9 In addition to the lack of effective educational
programs, developing nations are less likely to restrict smoking in
public buildings or workplaces.' 40 For example, in Guatemala,
smoking is permitted in schools and there are no restrictions on sell-
ing cigarettes to minors. 4 ' Thus, the Industry has exacted consider-
able harm on an extremely unsuspecting populace, making a stronger
case for liability.
The Industry takes advantage of this lack of awareness through
developing nations' mass media, which is not subject to the same
types of restrictions that exist in the United States. ' 4 In particular, the
Industry targets much of its advertising toward women, adolescents,
and children.14 ' For example, cigarette manufacturers often advertise
COLLABORATION WITH THE PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION 79 (1992)
[hereinafter SMOKING AND HEALTH] (contrasting various surveys on individuals'
attitudes toward smoking and health).
139. See WHO Fact Sheets, supra note 13 (describing the lack of awareness and
prevention efforts in many areas of Latin America); see also SMOKING AND
HEALTH, supra note 138, at 79 (citing a 1990 study where only thirty percent of
the physicians in Paraguay believed that smoking was undesirable).
140. See, e.g., SMOKING AND HEALTH, supra note 138, at 155 (stating that in
Guatemala, Venezuela, and Panama, smoking is not prohibited in health facilities).
141. See id. (comparing different restrictions on cigarette use in the western
hemisphere); see also Economics of Tobacco, supra note 12 (analyzing tobacco
regulations and restrictions in various nations).
142. See WHO Fact Sheets, supra note 13 (asserting that the tobacco industry's
advertising campaigns, combined with a lack of public awareness, have created an
atmosphere where smoking is socially acceptable); Johnson, supra note 13. at 28
(stating that the tobacco industry's advertising campaigns in the developing world
are even more effective due to the lack of regulations or advertising restrictions);
see also Yach, supra note 55 (stating that "[f]or many countries, even rudimentary
protection against tobacco imagery does not exist. Instead the Marlboro Man rides
high over the cities of many countries in Asia, East and Central Europe and Latin
America.").
143. See Advocacy for Policy Change, available at http://tobacco.who.
int/en/advocacy/ (last visited July 12, 2000) (asserting that the tobacco industry has
focused its advertising and marketing campaigns on women and children while
outlining ways the international community can combat such efforts); Big Tobacco
Abroad, WASH. POST, July 13, 1998, at A20 (arguing that the United States gov-
ernment should stop subsidizing tobacco marketing overseas, which attempts to
addict women and children through "sophisticated marketing campaigns featuring
female pop stars, giveaways of stylish lighters and relentless advertising."); see
also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 131, at 31 (stating that even in the developed
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in comic books, which are distributed in elementary schools.'" Such
advertisements often equate smoking to health and affluence.'4
Moreover, the health problems in the developing world are further
compounded by the higher potency of cigarettes sold in many devel-
oping nations as compared to the United States. 1t
As a result of the Industry's actions, tobacco consumption is ex-
pected to be the leading cause of death worldwide by the year
2030.147 Even worse, by the year 2020, seventy percent of all to-
bacco-related deaths will occur in the developing world, where gov-
ernments are least able to respond to complex health problems."' For
these reasons, the Industry's actions in the developing world have
been equated to a human rights violation."' Given the lack of aware-
world, youth and adolescents often lack the ability to make informed choices about
tobacco).
144. See Heidi S. Grunner, The Export of U.S. Tobacco Prochcts to Developing
and Previously Closed Markets, 28 LAW & POL'Y I N-r'L BL's. 217, 228-231 (1996)
(examining different methods by which the tobacco industry has expanded its sales
in the developing world).
145. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Smoke Across the 1'aters: Tobacco Prodhiction and
Exportation as International Human Rights V"iolations, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
355, 389 (1998) (describing how marketing campaigns in the developing world
have increased overall sales of tobacco throughout the 19 90's); see also Susan
Headden, The Marlboro Man Lives! Restrained at fonie, Tobacco Firms Step
Their Marketing Overseas, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.. Sept. 21, 1998, at 58
(describing how tobacco manufacturers engage in a practice called "brand stretch-
ing," which enables them to promote their names on non-tobacco products).
146. See Susan M. Marsh, U.S. Tobacco Erports: Toward Monitoring and
Regulation Consistent with Acknowledged Health Risks, 15 Wis. INT'L L.J. 29, 36
(1996) (arguing that the exportation of tobacco has created enormous health prob-
lems in the developing world and impeded economic growth, thus warranting
greater monitoring and restrictions).
147. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 131, at IX (stating that tobacco use will
account for 10 million deaths per year by 2030).
148. See Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Task Force on Tobacco Control: Report ol the
Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR. substantive session of 2000, Provisional Agenda
Item 7(d) at 5, U.N. Doc. E/2000/21 (2000). available at http://tobacco.who.
int/en/united-nations/ (asserting that tobacco use will be responsible for approxi-
mately one in eight deaths by the year 2020).
149. See Dhooge, supra note 145, at 412-16 (arguing that the tobacco industry
and the United States government have violated the personal and societal rights of
individuals living in the developing world). The author of the article argues that the
subsidization and exportation of tobacco products violates the right to life itself,
which was recognized in the U.N. Declaration of Human fights. See il. at 415-16
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ness, the extreme level of fraud and misrepresentations, and the
broad and devastating health effects, individual plaintiffs in a devel-
oping nation may stand a better chance of recovery.50 Although there
appears to be an undeniable harm, a lack of resources prevents most
individual plaintiffs in the developing world from bringing their
cases against the Industry.'"' By analyzing the practical considera-
tions that prevent an individual plaintiff from filing suit, as well as
the broad effects of tobacco consumption on a developing nation, a
compelling case can be made for parens patriae standing.'52
B. PARENS PATRIAE STANDING
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, a state can receive standing
to bring a claim when it seeks to further the quasi-sovereign interests
of its people.' Generally, a governing body may assert a quasi-
sovereign interest when it seeks to protect either the physical or eco-
nomic well being of its people or when it attempts to maintain its po-
sition in the federal system.'14 Thus, to obtain parens patriae standing,
(noting that advertisements, sponsorships, promotions, and the targeting of specific
groups have been primarily responsible for the growth in tobacco consumption).
Dhooge also argued that the tobacco industry has violated a right to health, which
was addressed in both the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See id. at 419-23 (asserting
that the United States has ignored the practices of the tobacco industry, which have
successfully circumvented modest tobacco control and prevention efforts in other
nations).
150. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 6 (stating that Third World plaintiffs would
have a compelling case for relief).
151. See, e.g., Pan American Health Organization, supra note 14 (stating that
75.2% of the Guatemalan people live in poverty).
152. See infra notes 153-183 and accompanying text (analyzing the doctrine of
parens patriae and applying it to tobacco litigation in the developing world).
153. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
601-03 (1982) (explaining that a quasi-sovereign interest can be broadly construed
as an interest that a state has in the well being of its citizens, while citing cases to
develop a more precise understanding of this unique interest).
154. See id. at 607 (concluding that quasi-sovereign interests are best articulated
on a case by case basis); see also Lisa Moscati Hawkes, Note, Parens Patriae and
the Union Carbide Case: The Disaster at Bhopal Continues, 21 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 181, 187-88 (1988) (distinguishing a quasi-sovereign interest from a state's
proprietary interest or an interest that an individual citizen may seek to remedy
through the court system).
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the state's claim must transcend its own proprietary interests,' as
well as its citizens' own individual interests.'" Moreover, the effects
of the defendant's actions have to be felt by a substantial majority of
a state's citizenry though the most direct injury may only affect a
limited number of individuals.'" To avoid the chance of a duplicative
recovery, however, the injury must be one that cannot be litigated by
an individual plaintiff.' In short, parens patriae standing is most ap-
propriate when a defendant has exacted significant harm upon a sub-
stantial number of people, but the injury is not readily justiciable by
individual plaintiffs. " 9
155. Cf h re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 134 (deciding that Guatemala cannot obtain parens patriae standing because
it is only seeking to recover damages to its own treasury. which is a propnetary
interest).
156. See id. (stating that parens patriae should not be used when a more appro-
priate party than the state is capable of bringing suit). Even though seventy-five
percent of the Guatemalan people live in poverty, the Guatemala court somehow
concluded that, each of the plaintiffs was capable of filing suit on their own. hi. Cf
Pfizer, Inc., 522 F.2d at 617 (refusing to allow the plaintiff governments to sue on
behalf of their citizens who are "legally entitled to sue on their own behalf but as a
practical matter generally unable to so.").
157. See Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (articulat-
ing that a state may assert parens patriae standing when the defendant's actions
have "substantial generalized economic effects.").
158. See id. ("[I]t is entirely clear that a state never has standing on the basis of
personal claims assigned to it by individuals."). set, also In re To-
bacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation. 83 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (denying
Guatemala parens patriae standing because "'individual Guatemalan smokers are
entirely capable of protecting themselves"), but see Pan .4meritan Health Organi-
zation, supra note 13 (stating that 75.2 percent of the Guatemalan people live in
poverty).
159. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 600 (quoting Mormon Church
v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)) ("[P]arens patriae is inherent in the su-
preme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in
the legislature [and] is... necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity,
and for the prevention of injury for those who cannot protect themselves."); see
also Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 675, n.42 (distinguishing the differences between a suit
where the remedies are not legally cognizable and a claim where an individual
plaintiff would be the most appropriate party to assert a particular interest).
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C. APPLICATION OF PARENS PATRIAE TO THE TOBACCO
LITIGATION
1. A Developing Nation's Health and Physical Well Being
When invoking parens patriae, a government must articulate an
injury either to the health and well being of its people or to the gen-
eral economy.' 60 As previously discussed, tobacco consumption in
the developing world has had a devastating effect on millions of citi-
zens.' 6' At the same time, the effects of the Industry's behavior have
gone beyond the injuries of individual plaintiffs, who, as demon-
strated previously, most likely lack the ability to file their own
claims.162 Tobacco consumption has de-stabilized fledgling health
care systems, adversely affecting both smokers and non-smokers.'
6 '
For example, in developing nations, the rise in tobacco-related ill-
nesses has occurred as governments have simultaneously attempted
to grapple with common infectious diseases that have long been
remedied in Western nations.'64 Instead of providing greater access to
vaccinations and preventive care, developing nations' health care
systems are struggling to provide treatments for lung cancer and res-
piratory diseases. Moreover, the effects of second hand smoke are
160. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607 (acknowledging certain basic
parameters of parens patriae even though the definition of a quasi-sovereign inter-
est must be formulated on a case-by-case basis).
161. See supra notes 130-152 and accompanying text (outlining how the lack of
warning labels, advertising restrictions, and public education programs, combined
with the industry's fraud and misrepresentations in the developing world will make
tobacco use the leading cause of death in the world by the year 2030).
162. See, e.g., Pan American Health Organization, supra note 14.
163. See Yach, supra note 55 (underscoring the severity of tobacco consumption
in the developing world and advocating for World No Tobacco Day, which is be-
ing used to raise awareness about tobacco and develop a world wide public health
agenda).
164. See id. (comparing the impact of tobacco consumption in the developed
world, where most infectious diseases have been brought under control with the
plight of the developing world, where "infectious diseases and under-nutrition co-
exist with a rising incidence of tobacco-induced chronic illnesses"). See, e.g., Pan
American Health Organization, supra note 14 (stating that in Guatemala, intestinal
parasitic diseases are one of the leading causes of death nationwide.).
165. See Yach, supra note 55, at 2 (describing the effect tobacco consumption
has had upon third world health care systems while emphasizing the need for to-
[ 16:809
THE TOBACCO INDUSTR '.iND Gu 4 TEA. IL.f
even more pronounced in developing nations, where there tend to be
fewer restrictions on smoking in public spaces than in the developed
world.'66 Thus, the Industry's behavior can place an enormous strain
on a developing nation's already overburdened health care system,
jeopardizing the health and well being of a majority of its citizens,
while providing a strong basis for parens patriae standing. '
By analyzing the broad health consequences of tobacco consump-
tion in the developing world, a nation such as Guatemala can make a
compelling case for parens patriae standing. First, even though a
limited number of people have suffered a direct injury such as a to-
bacco-related illness, a significant majority will be forced to grapple
with the long term consequences of smoking, such as a diminished
and ineffective health care system.' " In fact, a government is the only
party that may vindicate such a quasi-sovereign interest, which af-
fects the general health and well being of the entire nation.'' Second,
most private plaintiffs cannot file claims on their own behalf'"' The
bacco prevention, which can be funded through a higher excise tax on tobacco
products).
166. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 131, at 26-27 ("Adults exposed chroni-
cally to others' tobacco smoke also face small but real risks of lung cancer and
higher risks of cardiovascular disease, while the children of smokers suffer a range
of health problems and functional limitations."): see also SMOKING AND HEALTH
supra note 138, at 154-55 (stating that in Columbia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and
Guatemala smoking is not prohibited in schools). Moreover, in many nations, "'en-
forcement is weak or non-existent." Id.
167. See American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 962-63 (concluding that
Texas has a quasi-sovereign interest in ensuring the stability of its Medicaid pro-
gram and protecting the health and well being of its citizens).
168. See Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 675 ("[lI]t has been held sufficient that the direct
impact of the alleged wrong be felt by a substantial majority, though less than all,
of the state's citizens, so that the suit can be said to be for the benefit of the pub-
lic.").
169. Cf Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (holding
that a state had a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting "all the earth and air within
its domain" when the defendant copper companies had repeatedly discharged
noxious gas over the state's territory); Missouri v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 208, 241
(1901) (holding that Missouri was the proper entity to protect the health and com-
fort of its citizens when Chicago had been dumping sewage into the Mississippi
River, adversely affecting the drinking water in several cities and towns).
170. See Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 674 (prohibiting patens patnae standing when an
individual plaintiff could litigate a particular claim), In re TobaccoGovernmental
Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (asserting that patens patriae
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risk of an individual plaintiff initiating a suit is greatly diminished
since most citizens in a developing nation lack the resources to file
individual claims, and are denied access to their own court sys-
tems.1 7' Thus, when examining the overall health consequences of to-
bacco consumption, the state is the only possible party that can pro-
tect the physical well being of its citizens, providing a compelling
case for parens patriae standing.'72
2. A Developing Nation's Economic Well Being
A developing nation may also obtain parens patriae standing
against the Industry by claiming an injury to its economic well be-
ing.1 73 Excessive tobacco consumption adds significant costs to a na-
tion's health care industry, which is often passed on to non-smokers,
standing is inappropriate when individual parties are capable of bringing suit).
171. But see Pfizer, Inc., 522 F.2d at 617 (arguing that the practical limitations
of litigating a case, such as the economic status of the plaintiffs, should not give
rise to a parens patriae action). However, the interests represented by parens pa-
triae are best articulated on a case by case basis. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458
U.S. at 607; see also Service Employees Int'l Union Health and Welfare Benefit
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70, 79-80 (D.D.C. 1999) (establishing
differing precedent from four circuit courts while discussing the importance of a
"flexible and responsive" court system that enables plaintiffs that have clearly been
wronged to have their day in court); American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 962
(underscoring that the "only hard and steadfast rule" in evoking a quasi-sovereign
interest is that a state must be more than a nominal party).
172. Some have also argued that subrogation represents the most appropriate
way for a government to seek compensation for the costs of treating its citizens for
smoking-related illnesses. See Dagan & White, supra note 16, at 394-98 (arguing
that subrogation would limit multiple claims by individual plaintiffs while provid-
ing governments the power to recover public money spent on "preventative and
ameliorative" health care costs). But see Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Insur-
ance Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 771, 778 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 1998)
(articulating the limits of subrogation, which would require the subrogee "to offer
individual proofs (and overcome affirmative defenses) for each smoker as to whom
subrogation is claimed.").
173. See Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 674 ("[E]ven where the most direct injury is to a
fairly narrow class of persons, there is precedent for finding state standing on the
basis of substantial generalized economic effects."). But see Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972) (stating that an injury to the general economy is
"no more a reflection of injuries to the business or property of consumers" for
which individual plaintiffs may file antitrust claims under the Clayton Act, thereby
denying parens patriae standing under this particular circumstance).
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in the form of higher taxes.' 4 Moreover, tobacco consumption often
leads to lost productivity, which may have a further detrimental ef-
fect on economies in the developing world.' In fact, even the Gua-
temala decision acknowledged the possibility that the developing na-
tion may be able to assert an interest in the effect that tobacco
consumption has had on its economy.'- Thus, a developing nation
may obtain parens patriae standing based upon the effect tobacco
consumption has had on its overall economy.
D. LIMITS ON PARENS PATRIAE STANDING
While parens patriae standing may afford a developing nation an
opportunity to file suit against the Industry, the doctrine also contains
significant limits. First, in order to eliminate the risk of multiple re-
coveries, parens patriae standing should be restricted to only the
poorest of nations, where individual plaintiffs are unlikely to file
their own Suits. 7 7 The poverty rate in Guatemala, totaling three-
quarters of the population, provides an example of a nation that
would be considered sufficiently poor as to qualify for parens patriae
standing.7 9 Second, a developing nation also needs to articulate an
174. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 131. at 32-33 (estimating that tobacco
consumption has increased health care costs in developed countries between 6 and
15% while acknowledging the effect on health care systems in the developing
world is more difficult to quantify since "the epidemic of tobacco-related diseases
is at an earlier stage.").
175. Cf. TOLLISON & WAGNER, supra note 62, at 62 (citing a study by the Office
of Technology Assessment, which concluded that in the United States, the esti-
mated "cost of lost production ranged from 527 billion to S61 billion for 1985,
with a 'best' estimate of $43 billion.").
176. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 134 (asserting that Guatemala might be able to recover for the substantial
generalized economic effects of tobacco consumption but failed to do so when it
"stated that the damages it is seeking are 'to its own business or property (its treas-
ury) and not to the general economy"').
177. See American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (holding that the mil-
lions of dollars Texas had spent on treating tobacco-related illness had injured the
state's economy, thereby invoking a quasi-sovereign interest).
178. See hi re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation, 83 F. Supp.
2d at 134 (rejecting parens patriae standing because individual Guatemalan smok-
ers were capable of bringing their own claims).
179. See Pan-American Health Organi:ation, supra note 14 (stating that 58% of
the Guatemalan population lives in extreme poverty).
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injury beyond that of its individual citizens such as a greatly dimin-
ished health care system or injury to an already unstable economy.10
Moreover, a government must be able to prove that its expenditures
on smoking-related illnesses has inhibited its ability to grapple ef-
fectively with basic health care needs, such as providing immuniza-
tions.' Finally, parens patriae standing should be limited to in-
stances where an "undeniable harm"'8 2 has been exacted on a
substantial portion of a state's population.' 83 Thus, a government
would need to underscore the severity of the Industry's fraud and
manipulation unique to the developing world, while discussing the




Our court system faces a difficult task in balancing the needs of
developing nations that have been subject to the worst of the Indus-
try's fraud with the need to prevent an avalanche of claims from nu-
merous third parties.' 8' The remoteness doctrine, which formed the
basis of the Guatemala decision, fails to account adequately for the
unique harms that the Industry has exacted upon the developing
180. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607 (concluding that in order
to assert a quasi-sovereign interest, the state needs to be more than a "nominal
party."). See generally Hawkes, supra note 154, at 191 ("Courts view skeptically a
State's arguments regarding injury to its general economy as a basis for parens pa-
triae standing.").
181. See Yach, supra note 55 (examining how smoking-related illnesses pose a
double burden on developing nations, since their health care systems are still at-
tempting to cope with common infectious diseases that have long since been reme-
died in the developed world).
182. Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 675 n.42.
183. Cf Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 609 (holding that job dis-
crimination against an identifiable group of Puerto Rican citizens working in Vir-
ginia indirectly harms all Puerto Rican citizens, thereby allowing the Common-
wealth to assert a quasi-sovereign interest).
184. See supra notes 131-152 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
warning labels and advertising restrictions in the developing world, the Industry's
outright attempts to appeal to children, the higher potency of cigarettes in Third
World nations).
185. See generally Schwartz, supra note 5, at 427 (stating that the remoteness
doctrine is needed to prevent multiple recoveries for a single harm).
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world.' 6 Moreover, the remoteness doctrine overlooks distinctive
conditions in a developing nation that would virtually eliminate the
risks of multiple recoveries from different parties."
In contrast, the doctrine of parens patriae would enable the poorest
of developing nations to obtain standing against the Industry while
preventing numerous claims from more developed nations like the
United States or Canada. Given the catastrophic consequences of to-
bacco consumption in the developing world, parens patriae standing
provides both an equitable and balanced approach for adjudicating
claims by the developing world.
186. See supra notes 131-152 and accompanying text (discussing the industry's
strategies of marketing to women and children, the lack of warning labels, and the
lack of education and prevention programs).
187. See Statutoiy hIterpretation, supra note 44, at 1066 (stating that the doc-
trine of fraud provides a more useful framework than the remoteness doctnne for
examining claims by third parties).
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